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Renjian Buddhism: Its Origins and Divergences
engaged Buddhism (rushi fojiao 入世佛教), as a category of religiously inspired socio-political movements, is usually linked to the humanitar-
ian interventions initiated by Thich Nhat Hanh in the 1960s in order to reduce 
the suffering and alleviate the oppression of the Vietnamese people in the 
ongoing war.1 The category proposes a concretized Buddhist compassion 
and wisdom in the pursuit of social justice, thereby giving an active, public 
role to Buddhism, which is generally considered otherworldly. Nhat Hanh 
received an excellent religious education in literary Chinese. His category 
of engaged Buddhism is based in part on the Buddhist modernist move-
ment led by Taixu 太虛 (1890–1947) in early twentieth century China. Dur-
ing the period from the 1920s to the 1940s, Taixu recommended a series of 
reformist experiments in monastic Buddhism, at both the theoretical and 
This arTicle is a result of the “Buddhism after Mao: Religion, Politics, and Society in 
China since the 1980s” Project funded by the City of Paris as part of its “Emergence(s)” 
program. I thank Rongdao Lai, Jessica L. Main, the anonymous reviewers and the editors of 
The Eastern Buddhist for their comments and editing, which helped improve the manuscript.
1 Engaged Buddhism is usually considered a religious reaction to the Vietnam War, but it 
has its roots in the Mahayana Buddhist tradition, Buddhist reform movements in East Asia 
in the early-to-mid twentieth century, and the colonization experience of Vietnam. Since the 
1980s, it has referred to a wide range of Buddhist phenomena involving different concepts 
and models of social engagement in both Asian and Western countries.
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institutional levels. His endeavors greatly changed the landscape of Chi nese 
Buddhism and deeply impacted Vietnamese Buddhism of the same and 
subsequent periods.2
Taixu’s modern Buddhism focused on “human life” (rensheng 人生) 
and the “human realm” or “this world” (renjian 人間). In the early 1920s, 
he labeled his reformist efforts with the term “Buddhism for human life” 
(rensheng fojiao 人生佛教). He emphasized that the perfection of personal-
ity is the precondition for (if not the same thing as) achieving Buddhahood 
and that a modern Buddhism must base itself not on “ghosts” (gui 鬼) and 
“death” (si 死)—that is to say, ideas of the afterworld and the performance 
of funerary services—but upon “humans” (ren 人) and “life” (sheng 生). 
In 1926, Taixu put forward the idea of building a “Pure Land on Earth” 
(renjian jingtu 人間凈土), which would be accomplished by activism such 
as founding local Buddhist communities and attempting to reform society 
through the practice of Buddhist morality. In 1933, Taixu gave a famous 
lecture in Hankou, in which he forged for the first time the notion of “Renjian 
Buddhism” (renjian fojiao 人間佛教) or “Buddhism for this world”:3
Renjian Buddhism is neither the Buddhism that teaches people to 
be divorced from humankind to become deities or ghosts, nor the 
Buddhism that teaches everyone to leave his family to become a 
monk in the monastery or in mountains and forests. It is the Bud-
dhism that, based on Buddhist principles, tries to reform society, 
so as to bring progress to humankind and advance the world.4
In this speech, Taixu made clear his concept of Renjian Buddhism: it 
values the rationalization of belief and social responsibilities for Buddhists, 
and brings the modern notions of reform, progress, and moral universalism 
into Buddhist discourse. Furthermore, in 1934, disciples of Taixu, notably 
Fafang 法舫 (1904–1951) and Daxing 大醒 (1900–1952), expounded the ideas 
of Renjian Buddhism and its relations with history, education, and politics in 
a special issue of the Buddhist periodical Haichaoyin 海潮音 devoted explic-
itly to the movement. For Taixu, “Rensheng Buddhism” and “Renjian Bud-
dhism” were synonymous, though he employed the former most frequently 
in his own works. In 1944, three years before he passed away, Taixu col-
2 About Taixu, see Pittman 2001. On the historical link between Taixu’s Buddhist reforms 
and Thich Nhat Hanh’s engaged Buddhism, see DeVido 2009.
3 It is also translated as “Humanistic Buddhism,” “This-Worldly Buddhism,” or “Buddhism 
in This World.”
4 Taixu (1933) 1956, p. 431.
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lected his essays on both “Buddhism for human life” and “Buddhism for this 
world” into a book entitled Buddhism for Human Life (Rensheng fojiao 人生
佛教).
In 1949, two years after the death of Taixu, Yinshun 印順 (1906–2005), 
Taixu’s disciple, foremost spiritual heir, and chief compiler of his com-
plete works (1956), escaped to Hong Kong before the establishment of a 
communist regime in mainland China. Yinshun reached Taiwan in 1952 
and proceeded to publish a series of works elucidating Taixu’s ideas and 
reasserting the notion of Renjian Buddhism. He underlined that the Buddha, 
Dharma, and Sangha are all in and for the “human realm,” and promoted 
a Buddhism that concerned itself with social welfare. Yinshun’s formula-
tion proved very attractive to the youth. From then on, the name Renjian 
Buddhism, “Buddhism for this world,” gradually replaced Rensheng 
Buddhism and became the consensus term for the Buddhist modernist move-
ments in contemporary Taiwan. After the economic takeoff and political 
liberalization of the 1980s, Taiwan witnessed a rapid growth of Buddhism, 
with its largest organizations, including Foguangshan 佛光山, Ciji (or Tzu 
Chi, more fully, Ciji Gongdehui 慈濟功德会), and Fagushan 法鼓山, claiming 
the promotion of Renjian Buddhism as their principle tenet. The global-
ized propagation of Buddhism, humanitarian commitments, and academic 
investments of these organizations are considered not only the embodiment 
of Taixu’s Renjian Buddhism, but also the Chinese expression of engaged 
Bud dhism.5
In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the fate of Renjian Buddhism 
has been completely different for political reasons. Taixu, along with many 
in his circle, maintained close ties with the Nationalist Party (KMT), the 
enemy par excellence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Taixu him-
self, for example, had befriended several high-ranking KMT officials includ-
ing Chiang Kai-shek. So, after 1949, the word “Taixu,” which had been a key 
reference in any discussion of modern Chinese Buddhism rapidly became a 
word to be avoided. For roughly three decades, both “Rensheng Buddhism” 
and “Renjian Buddhism” disappeared from the lexicon of mainland Chinese 
Buddhists, although traces of Taixu’s reformist Buddhism remained.
In fact, under the communist regime, Buddhism became involved in a 
series of political movements, such as the Land Reform, the mobilization for 
the Korean War, the conflicts in Tibet, and the Great Leap Forward. Some 
5 For Taixu’s legacy of Renjian Buddhism in Taiwan, see Pittman 2001, chapter 6. For the 
social and political participation of large-scale Buddhist organizations in Taiwan, see Laliberté 
2004, Madsen 2007.
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Chinese Buddhist elites, aside from their adoption of political terms like 
“anti-feudalism,” “patriotism,” “anti-imperialism,” “revolution,” “socialism,” 
and “collectivism,” felt compelled to justify the uses of Buddhism with 
a vocabulary internal to Buddhism itself. Hence, they retained the notion 
of a “Pure Land on Earth,” and sometimes employed similar metaphors 
such as “Country of Happiness on Earth” (renjian leguo 人間樂國), “Land 
of Happiness on Earth” (renjian letu 人間樂土) or “Sukhāvatī on Earth” 
(renjian jile shijie 人間極樂世界) in the new context, interpreting their sub-
mission to communist policies as a Buddhist moral imperative.6 As par-
allels to communist notions of “patriotism” and “popular sovereignty,” 
these Buddhists proposed slogans such as “to adorn the country’s land, to 
benefit sentient beings” (zhuangyan guotu, lile youqing 莊嚴國土, 利樂有
情). Using the rhetoric of “repaying the debt of gratitude” (bao’ en 報恩, 
to one’s country or to sentient beings), they tried to justify unconditional 
collaboration with the CCP, and even to deny or disregard the most palpable 
facts of political repression and religious persecution. However, obedience 
did not prevent the decline of Buddhism under Maoist totalitarianism. 
The Anti-Right campaigns of 1957 eroded the last vestiges of Buddhism’s 
autonomy. Then the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) brought an unprec-
edented degree of destruction to Buddhism,7 as both pro-communist and 
traditional forms of Buddhism were prohibited. Temples were destroyed 
and monks were forced to return to lay life. Countless Buddhist relics 
(including the stūpa of Taixu in Zhejiang) were destroyed.
The Cultural Revolution ended after Mao’s death in 1976 and Chinese 
Buddhism gradually resumed activity in the early years of the 1980s. It was 
during this period that the slogan “Renjian Buddhism,” propagated by Zhao 
Puchu 趙朴初 (1907–2000), chairman of the Buddhist Association of China 
(BAC, Zhongguo Fojiao Xiehui 中國佛教協會), reappeared in the PRC. Thirty 
years later, Renjian Buddhism has become the official Buddhist ideology 
in China today, with Zhao Puchu portrayed as the spiritual heir of Taixu by 
various authors.8 Is this new Renjian Buddhism in post-Mao China a con-
tinuation of Taixu’s reformist project? Can it also be regarded as a form 
of engaged Buddhism? The present essay is an attempt to answer these 
6 Welch 1972, chapter 8.
7 There were several persecutions of Buddhism over the course of Chinese history, all of 
which, however, were regional and short-lived.
8 This view is held by most of the recent mainland Chinese publications on Zhao Puchu’s 
Renjian Buddhism. See, for example, Xu 2007; Deng, Chen, and Mao 2009. For a justifica-
tion of Zhao’s Renjian Buddhism as a development of Taixu’s notion, see Deng 2003.
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questions through an examination of the theory and practice of Renjian 
Buddhism proposed by Zhao Puchu.
A Buddhist Translation of Political Order: Zhao Puchu’ s Renjian Buddhism
On 25 January 1980, the Central Committee of the CCP formally permitted 
the resumption of nationwide activities by all official religious organiza-
tions.9 In December, the BAC convened its Fourth Congress, marking the 
start of the institutional reconstruction of Chinese Buddhism. It was during 
this congress that the lay Buddhist Zhao Puchu, “comrade” of the CCP10 
and the key figure in charge of the substantive work of the BAC since its 
foundation in 1953, was formally “elected” as its chairman. At the end of 
his congress report, Zhao introduced once again the notion of a “Pure Land 
on Earth,” which he had repeatedly analogized with the CCP’s ideal of 
“socialism” since the 1950s:
Under the glorious light of the Party’s religious policies, let us 
follow the teachings of Buddha, continue the wishes of the vir-
tuous of all ages, carry on the excellent traditions of Chinese 
Buddhism, “repay the debt of gratitude to the country and to 
all sentient beings,” strive to build a “Pure Land on Earth,” and 
“constantly bring happiness to all sentient beings.”11
In December 1981, Zhao made a speech in a meeting of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference, where he stated yet again that 
the Buddhist idea of a “Pure Land on Earth” contained elements of social-
ism.12 In March 1982, he identified the building of a Pure Land on Earth as a 
Buddhist ideal in his honorary doctorate acceptance speech at Bukkyō Uni-
versity in Japan.13 At the same time, between 1981 and 1983, he published 
9 Luo 2001, p. 264.
10 Zhao is officially called “comrade” (tongzhi 同志) in the governmental discourse in the 
PRC. It is widely believed by Chinese Buddhists that he was a secret member of the CCP, 
though no official proof can be found.
11 Zhao (1980) 2007, p. 452.
12 Zhao (1981) 2007, p. 499. It is important to point out that “socialism” has a different 
meaning in the Chinese context from its usual understanding in the West. Identified as the 
preliminary stage of communism, socialism is given different interpretations by the CCP 
according to historical conjunctures, but the immutable core is the hegemony of the CCP. 
In other words, “socialism” in the PRC is equivalent to the “communist regime” in Western 
contexts.
13 Zhao (1982) 2007, p. 512.
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a series called “Questions and Answers on the General Knowledge of 
Buddhism” (Fojiao changshi wenda 佛教常識問答) in Fayin 法音 (Voice of 
Dharma), the newly restored bulletin of the BAC. Parts of this series had 
already been published between 1959 and 1960, but in June 1983, a new 
section, entitled “Carry on the Superiority of Renjian Buddhism,” was pub-
lished.14 It was the first time the concept of “Renjian Buddhism” appeared 
in the official discourse of the BAC. However, Zhao made no mention of 
Taixu. Concerning the originator of the idea of Renjian Buddhism, he only 
used the vague expression “the forerunners” (qianren 前人). In his succinct 
statements, Zhao made no reference to Taixu’s theory but instead tried to 
forge a link between Buddhism and the CCP’s ideology and policy, using 
vocabulary in accordance with the political climate at that time. According 
to Zhao, the significance of propagating Renjian Buddhism was found in 
the way Buddhist ethics helped to nurture individual morality, and hence 
benefit the country and society as a whole.
In December 1983, Zhao delivered a report entitled Thirty Years of the 
Buddhist Association of China in a meeting of the BAC, which can be seen 
as one of the most important documents of post-Mao Buddhism. Its impor-
tance does not lie in Zhao’s selective summary of the achievements of BAC, 
but in his presentation of the goal and future development of Chinese Bud-
dhism thereafter. He raised two crucial questions in this report:
Chinese Buddhism has a long history of nearly two thousand 
years. Where should Chinese Buddhism go in the present era? 
What are the excellent traditions of Chinese Buddhism that we 
should carry on?15
To the first question, he answered, “I think we should promote the thought 
of Renjian Buddhism in our articles of faith.” In his view, Renjian Buddhism 
embodies the practice and commitment of the Mahayana vow of “benefitting 
both self and others” (zili lita 自利利他). Based on passages from the Ekottara 
Āgama and the Platform Sutra (Liuzu tanjing 六祖壇經), Zhao explained that,
The Buddha was born in this world. He preached the Dharma and 
saved living beings in this world. The Dharma originates from 
this world and is intended to benefit this world. To promote the 
idea of Renjian Buddhism, we should practice the Five Precepts 
(wujie 五戒) and the Ten Wholesome Deeds (shishan 十善) to 
14 Zhao (1983a) 2007, p. 672.
15 Zhao (1983b) 2007, p. 562.
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purify ourselves, and follow the Four Means of Embracing (sishe 
四 ) and Six Perfections (liudu 六度) for the benefit of the people. 
We would then voluntarily take up the task of realizing a Pure 
Land on Earth, and devote our light and warmth to the pursuit of 
socialist modernization, which is the noble cause of “adorning the 
land and benefitting sentient beings.”16
To the second question, Zhao answered that there are “three excellent tra-
ditions” of Chinese Buddhism that should be carried forward. The first is the 
tradition to “combine Chan with agricultural work” (nongchan bingzhong 農
禪並重). In other words, Buddhists should “actively participate in productive 
labor and other practices in service to the cause of building socialism.” 
The second tradition is that of “academic study” (xueshu yanjiu 學術研究). 
Chinese Buddhists should proceed with it “to enable our active participation 
in the building of a socialist spiritual civilization.” The last excellent tradition 
of “friendly international exchange” (guoji youhao jiaoliu 國際友好交流) 
should be developed to “enable our active participation in the enterprise 
of promoting our friendship with peoples around the world, advancing the 
cultural exchange between China and other nations, and defending world 
peace.”17
In his speech Zhao gave several examples to try to prove that these 
“excellent traditions” have their historical roots in China. Zhao is not 
wrong on this point. Nonetheless, these traditions are no substitute for the 
ultimate concern of Buddhism: the release from this world of desires and 
suffering. In his discourse, however, the three traditions become the most 
important substance, if not the only substance, of Buddhism. Precisely as 
the “excellent traditions” enumerated by Zhao are all this-worldly oriented, 
they are regarded as the tangible expression of his Renjian Buddhism by 
both Buddhists and scholars in mainland China.18
Where, then, do the “one thought (of Renjian Buddhism)” and “three tra-
ditions” of Zhao come from? Do they represent a rediscovery of the ideas 
of Taixu? Indeed, Taixu mentioned the concepts of “agricultural Chan” 
(nongchan 農禪) and “work Chan” (gongchan 工禪), encouraged monks 
to engage in Buddhist studies, and was enthusiastic in the propagation of 
Buddhism in the world. Zhao had contacts with Taixu in his youth and 
seemed to appreciate Taixu’s reforms. However, Taixu did not limit Renjian 
Buddhism to the three traditions proposed by Zhao. Zhao, moreover, never 
16 Zhao (1983b) 2007, p. 562.
17 Ibid.
18 For example, Deng 1998; Chen et al. 2000, pp. 278–85; Yang 2005; Zhao 2012.
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admitted that his version of Renjian Buddhism came from Taixu, glossing 
over Taixu’s pioneering role in the modernization of Chinese Buddhism 
by referring to Renjian Buddhism as “an idea already present in early 
Buddhism,” as being “not founded afterwards.”19 Of course, as is suggested 
by some authors,20 Taixu might still have been a subject of much political 
sensitivity when Zhao re-launched the notion of Renjian Bud dhism. 
However, the situation was changing. Since the end of the 1970s, CCP’s 
Taiwan policy has gradually shifted from military “liberation” to “peace-
ful unification.” The antagonism between the CCP and the KMT was then 
mitigated. At the same time, the exchanges between mainland and overseas 
Chinese Buddhists have greatly increased, while many of the latter vener-
ated Taixu as a great master. Under such circumstances, the insistence of 
a negative assessment of Taixu became outdated. Finally in 1987, on the 
occasion of the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of his death, 
Taixu was allowed to reappear in the discourse of mainland Chinese Bud-
dhism as a positive figure, seen in the publication of a special issue of 
Fayin in his memory (no. 4, 1987). It must be recognized that Zhao had 
made contributions to this, since he was then the chief editor of Fayin. Nev-
ertheless, surprisingly in Zhao’s public statements from then until his death 
in 2000, we cannot find any instances in which he attributed his Renjian 
Buddhism to Taixu.
Zhao’s omission of Taixu is not without reason. In fact, the content that 
he expressed with Taixu’s term “Renjian Buddhism” came rather from the 
CCP. On 31 March 1986, in a conversation with cadres of the CCP Cen-
tral Committee, Zhao explained the “inner implications” of his proposal 
of Renjian Buddhism: “My notion of Renjian Buddhism,” said Zhao, “is 
in fact proposed from the angle of making Buddhism adapt and adjust to 
socialism,” and “is for encouraging Buddhists to better serve socialism.”21 
In 1982, one year before Zhao’s launching of Renjian Buddhism, some CCP 
cadres responsible for formulating religious policies, including Li Weihan 
李維漢 (1896–1984), Hu Qiaomu 胡喬木 (1912–1992) and Luo Zhufeng 羅
竹風 (1911–1996), raised the issue of making religions adapt or adjust to 
socialism22 in order to provide a justification for the CCP’s policy change: 
prior to 1980, the CCP’s policy had been to eliminate religions, but now 
religions were allowed to exist if political requirements were satisfied. It 
19 Zhao (1987) 2007.
20 Deng 1998; Chen et al. 2000.
21 Zhao (1986) 2007, p. 757.
22 Gong and Wang 2006; Wei 2000.
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is against this background that Zhao proposed Renjian Buddhism, which 
could be, it seemed to him, linked with socialism.
Additionally, in 1982, the Central Committee of the CCP issued Docu-
ment Number 19, entitled The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious 
Question during Our Country’ s Socialist Period, which summarizes the 
historical experience gained by the CCP in the understanding and handling 
of the religious issue, and clarifies the fundamental principles for the 
religious policy of post-Mao China. According to this document,
It is imperative to organize members of the religious community, 
according to their different situations and strengths, to participate 
in productive labor, social service, the academic study of religion, 
patriotic social or political activities, and friendly international 
exchanges, in order to muster their positive elements in service to 
the cause of the building of socialist modernization.23
In my view, this statement is a harbinger for Zhao’s choice to present Chinese 
Buddhism using the rhetoric of the “three excellent traditions” the following 
year.24 As such, Zhao’s Renjian Buddhism is not a return to the modernist 
Buddhism of Taixu, but rather an active theoretical response to the new CCP 
religious policy, or, more accurately, a Buddhist translation of the Party’s 
demand on religions. In fact, even the term “carrying forward the excellent 
traditions of Buddhism” was inserted into the BAC constitution by Mao 
Zedong, when he was presented with its draft in 1953.25 The word “excellent” 
also placed Buddhism in a position to be evaluated by political authority: the 
legitimacy of Buddhist ideas and practices depended on their utility to the 
CCP.
The “Three Excellent Traditions”: The Practices and Consequences of 
Renjian Buddhism
As communist religious policy in the 1980s was, to a certain degree, a 
return to the policy preceding the Cultural Revolution, the roots of Renjian 
Buddhism in the 1980s can be partially found in the official discourse on 
Buddhism in the 1950s. In its essence, Zhao’s Renjian Buddhism shares 
the same aim as his concepts of a “Pure Land on Earth.” The last two of the 
23 Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui 1982.
24 Hu (2007) has remarked the correspondence between the political demands on religion 
and the self-demands of religious institutions.
25 Zhu 2005, p. 60.
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so-called “three excellent traditions” already appear in Zhao’s commentary 
on the life of the Tang-dynasty monk Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664) in 1956.26 
Likewise, the two traditions of “combining Chan with agricultural work” and 
“academic study” are obviously influenced by the two slogans declaring that 
Buddhism needs to “shift to production” (shengchanhua 生産化) and “shift to 
scholarship” (xueshuhua 學術化), conceptualized first by the pro-communist 
monk Juzan 巨贊 (1908–1984) in the 1940s and officially put forward by the 
BAC in the 1950s.27 However, the same words can carry vastly different 
meanings in different social contexts. In the 1950s, this-worldly discourses 
of Buddhism mainly served the etatization of Bud dhism,28 whereas after the 
Cultural Revolution, Renjian Buddhism has provided a political legitimacy 
for the institutional revival of Chinese Buddhism while at the same time 
limiting the form and direction of this revival.
According to the decision adopted by the Fifth Congress of the BAC in 
March 1987, “advocating the active and progressive thought of Renjian 
Buddhism” was written into the revised BAC constitution as one of its 
missions.29 From January 1990 onwards, “Promoting Renjian Buddhism” 
appears on the front cover of the monthly Fayin (and later, from 2011 on, 
on the table of contents page). In attempting to position the association as 
a church-like “organization of religious affairs,” the Sixth Congress of the 
BAC revised its constitution again in December 1993, removing the phrase 
“advocating the active and progressive thought of Renjian Buddhism.” The 
idea of Renjian Buddhism, however, remained influential. After Zhao’s 
death, Renjian Buddhism became the stance publicly upheld by successive 
BAC leaderships.30 At the Seventh Congress of the BAC in 2002, “advocacy 
of the thought of Renjian Buddhism” was written back into the constitution 
as a main mission of the association.31 The new constitution of 2010 has the 
even more proactive goal to “apply the thought of Renjian Buddhism.”32
26 Zhao (1956) 2007. In this article, Zhao considers the three most important “excellent 
traditions” of Chinese Buddhism to be: the sacrifice of one’s life in search of the Dharma, 
rigorousness in translation and scholarship, and the efforts towards international cultural 
exchange.
27 On Juzan and his collaboration with the CCP, see Xue Yu 2009.
28 That is to say, the human, material, and spiritual resources of Buddhism were controlled, 
appropriated, and used by the secular party-state according to its ideology and for its polit-
ical purposes. For more discussion on this issue, see Ji 2008.
29 Zhongguo Fojiao Xiehui 1987, p. 14.
30 Zhengcheng 2008.
31 Zhongguo Fojiao Xiehui 2002, p. 25.
32 Zhongguo Fojiao Xiehui 2010, p. 24.
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The reason why Renjian Buddhism maintains its dominance in the dis-
course of the BAC to the present day is that it conforms to the communist 
policy to control and use religions. At the same time, it provides a legitimate 
mode of existence for Buddhism in the economic, cultural, and political 
contexts of post-Mao China. From this point of view, each of the “three 
excellent traditions” served a different purpose. The Land Reform of the 
1950s deprived Buddhist monasteries of their traditional source of revenue, 
namely farm rents. Once reopened in the 1980s, monasteries immediately 
faced severe economic challenges. Economic self-sufficiency through agri-
culture, under the slogan of “combining Chan with agricultural work,” was 
the only means of survival for most monasteries in rural areas. A survey of 
sixteen monasteries in Fujian Province, for example, indicates that the har-
vest from the fields and forests provided 75.7% of their income in 1983.33 
Among the landless monasteries, some built factories or clinics; others 
traded in Buddhist good-luck charms and charged an entrance fee from 
visitors to their premises. Yet others ran hotels or vegetarian restaurants. 
These combinations of Buddhism with industrial work and commerce have 
sometimes been interpreted as new variations of “combinations of Chan with 
agricultural work.”34 More importantly, Buddhism and the other religions 
had for a long time been stigmatized by the state. This stigmatization con-
tinued to some extent in the 1980s, and Buddhism was still treated as a 
pernicious remnant of the feudal past. In this context, participation in 
“pro ductive labor” by monks was proof of the social utility of Buddhism. 
After the 1990s, with the massive surge in the number of Buddhists and 
improvement of their economic conditions, donations of lay believers and 
remuneration of religious services gradually became the major source 
of revenue for most monasteries. Because physical work no longer has 
pride of place in the official ideology, there is no reason for monks to 
participate directly in agricultural labor. Nonetheless, “combining Chan 
with agricultural work” is still widely applied rhetorically as a justification 
of profit-making activities conducted by monasteries, such as the operation 
of vegetarian restaurants or participation in the tourism industry.35
In the 1950s, the slogan “shift to scholarship” served mainly to distinguish 
a reformed Buddhism from popular cults and folk expressions of Buddhism 
classified as “superstitions,” which were repressed by the state in modern 
33 Renren 1985.
34 Cf. Chen 1991; Jing Yin 2006.
35 On the evolution of monastic economy, and the related changes in the state-religion rela-
tionship in post-Mao China, see Ji 2004.
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China. However, in the 1980s, emphasis on “academic study” helped the 
legal dissemination of Buddhist knowledge widely in society. “Academic 
study” here refers to humanistic research including literary, artistic, 
historical, and philosophical interpretations of Buddhism. The quantitative 
growth of Buddhist studies since the 1990s is remarkable. For example, no 
research article or book on Buddhism was published in the PRC between 
1967 and 1973. However, 1,125 articles on Buddhism were published in 
1992 alone, which is equal to the sum of all titles in the previous seventeen 
years.36 Between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, the Internet was not 
available to the general public and control of religious publications was 
extremely strict. Under such circumstances, scholarly works on Buddhism 
as a “cultural” phenomenon effectively evaded government censorship. 
With the growth of the economic and social power of Buddhism in the 
1990s, Buddhist institutions began to invest heavily in scholarship. Many 
monasteries and lay groups founded institutions for Buddhist studies, with 
or without governmental approval. They published periodicals, sponsored 
academic events, and invited secular researchers of Buddhism to write 
works and lecture to monks and followers. This investment created an 
alliance between Buddhists and lay intellectuals, contributed to the image of 
Buddhism as an “elite religion,” and helped revitalize Sangha education.
In a similar way, the notion of “friendly international exchange” served 
also as one initial impetus for the restoration of Chinese Buddhism after 
the Cultural Revolution. In fact, many Buddhist monasteries in China 
were permitted to resume their religious activities only in order to serve 
foreign and overseas Chinese Buddhist visitors. For example, in April 
1979, the temple Shaolinsi 少林寺 in Henan Province, famous for its martial 
arts tradition, was allowed to open to the Japanese pilgrim Sō Dōshin 宗
道臣 (1911–1980), the founder of the World Martial Arts of Shaolin (Jp. 
Shōrinji kempō 少林寺拳法). About a dozen monks from Shaolin, who were 
then working as farmers on about two hectares of land, received special 
permission from Beijing to resume their religious lifestyle. Seizing the 
opportunity, they restarted the daily rituals that had been forbidden for 
more than ten years. Similarly, in response to numerous Japanese pilgrims 
throughout the 1980s, the monastery Bailin Chansi 柏林禪寺, once a famous 
center of Buddhism in northern China, was finally handed over to the 
Buddhists for reconstruction as an authorized “site for religious activities” 
in 1988 after nearly thirty years of occupation by factories and schools.37
36 Wang 1995.
37 Ji 2007.
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On the other hand, recognizing the influence of Buddhism in the Chinese 
world and other East Asian countries, the CCP government readily uses 
Buddhism to realize the aims of its foreign policy. For example, after the 
repression of Falun Gong 法輪功 in 1999, the Chinese government sent at 
least two “Delegations of Chinese Religions” to United Nations dialogues 
on human rights in Geneva. Headed by Buddhist monks, they defended 
the Chinese policies on religion. In 2002 and 2004, the Chinese govern-
ment organized exhibitions of a relic of the Buddha’s finger in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong, respectively. The first exhibition was a reaction to the cultural 
de-sinization of Chen Shui-bian’s government in Taiwan, while the second 
was an attempt to repair the relationship between Beijing and Hong Kong 
residents after a large-scale anti-government demonstration in the previous 
year. Another recent example is the “World Buddhist Forum” organized by 
the State Bureau of Religious Affairs and the BAC successively in 2006, 
2009, and 2012. These events brought together hundreds of representatives 
from different countries, except, of course, the Dalai Lama or any Buddhist 
leaders defined by the CCP as “hostile” to China. This kind of political 
utility has earned Buddhism more political favors and public visibility 
compared to other religions, and, as such, stimu lated the BAC to go further 
in this direction. In a similar vein, Zhao Puchu’s efforts in the 1990s were 
oriented toward developing non-governmental diplomacy with Japan and 
Korea. He called Buddhist culture the “golden link” between China and 
these countries.38 The current leaders of BAC seem even more ambitious. 
One even openly suggested that the CCP enhance the “soft power” of the 
state using Buddhism in order to overcome “the attempts to demonize 
China by hostile Western powers.”39
In summary, Renjian Buddhism, encapsulated in the “three excellent 
tradi tions,” involved Buddhism in the social and political construction of 
contem porary China. In this process, the Buddhist institution successfully 
obtained a legitimate mode of expression and gradually expanded its 
social influence. However, this process was not without sacrifices. Profit-
making activities have undermined the traditional image of Buddhism as 
a reli gion detached from the accumulation of wealth, fomented corruption 
in the Sangha, and as a result, compromised its moral authority. Even 
if the development of tourism is managed by the government with the 
majority of the profits going to local authorities and companies close to 
them, expectations about the religious purity of the Sangha inevitably raise 
38 Zhao (1993) 2007.
39 Xuecheng 2008.
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suspicion among devout lay Buddhists. Academic research is, in most cases, 
not intended to express the physical, mental, and emotional experiences 
provoked by religions. Because of the positivism and critical attitude often 
assumed by scholarship, Renjian Buddhism’s pursuit of academic study is 
rather deconstructive to some central ideas of Buddhism. Finally, serving 
political power constitutes an open assent to the state’s appropriation 
of Buddhism’s symbolic resources. It exacerbates the secularization of 
Buddhism in a way that is, no doubt, different from the violent deprivation 
and devastation of Buddhist properties during the pre-Reform era, but that 
still results in a desacralization of the religion and a loss of control of the 
Buddhist establishment’s own resources.40
A Comparison of Zhao’ s Renjian Buddhism and Engaged Buddhism: Which 
World? How to Be Engaged?
Renjian Buddhism under Zhao encouraged Buddhist participation in eco-
nomic, cultural and political life. Does this variety of Buddhism count as a 
form of engaged Buddhism? Of course, the answer to this question depends 
on our definition of engaged Buddhism. But it seems to me safe to assert 
that the Renjian Buddhism proposed by Zhao is not the engaged Buddhism 
represented by Nhat Hanh, in which autonomous religious organizations 
mobilize for peace, justice, and freedom.
The main difference between Zhao and Nhat Hanh lies in two aspects. 
Firstly, they display different attitudes toward this world. Nhat Hanh’s 
engaged Buddhism concerns itself above all with the social suffering and 
oppression in this world, and attempts to reduce this suffering and oppression 
by collective moral conscience and through political and social reforms. For 
him, exposing unjust situations, enumerating the various causes of injustice, 
and removing injustice are applications of the Buddhist principles of the 
Four Noble Truths.41
In contrast, Zhao’s Renjian Buddhism in the PRC does not address the 
systematic political repression suffered by people, even when they are 
Buddhists. The admission of “suffering” would imply a criticism of the 
regime and contradict the propaganda of the CCP. Accordingly, advocates 
of Renjian Buddhism have never dared to tackle social problems in a 
serious way. They discourage, even forbid, individual Buddhists’ criticism 
of political power. In 1983, after the unprecedented devastation suffered by 
40 Ji 2011a.
41 Thich Nhat Hanh 1998, pp. 43–44.
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the Chinese people during the Cultural Revolution, Zhao still claimed that 
“the beautiful present and the glorious future would not be possible without 
the leadership of the Party.”42 At the same time, when he proposed Renjian 
Buddhism as the future direction of Chinese Buddhism, he claimed that 
the “basic experiences” that Buddhists should “remember forever” are to 
“voluntarily accept the leadership of the Party and the government,” and to 
“stand firmly opposed to hostile elements that seek to sabotage the socialist 
system.”43 It would not be difficult to infer that, for Zhao, the “human 
realm” of Renjian Buddhism is not this world per se, but the present 
political system that stands beyond criticism.
Secondly, these two Buddhisms recommend different interventions in this 
world. Nhat Hanh’s style of engaged Buddhism is often embodied in religio-
political movements that are independent from the state. Such movements, 
usually organized around charismatic leaders, strive for the realization of 
social justice by means of equality-based dialogue or by appeal to public 
opinion. Zhao’s Renjian Buddhism, by contrast, has demonstrated neither 
the motivation nor the courage to organize independent social movements, 
as it explicitly acknowledges the absolute authority of the party-state over 
religions. After the 1980s, Zhao Puchu and the BAC contributed to the 
restoration of Chinese Buddhism with “three excellent traditions” of pro-
ductive labor, academic study, and friendly international exchange, but they 
were evasive in the face of political restriction. In its interaction with the 
state, the BAC usually sought compromise that addressed interests on either 
side, rather than appealing to any normative principles of social justice.
After 1990, with the change in the mode of the CCP’s governmentality, 
the economic strengthening of Buddhism, and due in part to the influences of 
Taiwanese Buddhism, philanthropy and youth-oriented mobilization started 
to appear in Chinese Buddhism.44 Those activities, also considered prac-
tices of “Renjian Buddhism,” do go beyond Zhao’s original conception put 
forward in the 1980s. However, this philanthropy consists mainly of mone-
tary donations to the government rather than toward humanitarian interven-
tion by Buddhists and others; the youth activities, as well, are limited to 
religious assemblies held inside monasteries, and do not include social ser-
vices. These developments remain of limited value to Chinese civil society.45
42 Zhao (1983b) 2007, p. 559.
43 Ibid., pp. 558–59.
44 Laliberté 2012; Ji 2011b.
45 Recently in the PRC, some Buddhists have begun to engage in the pursuit of social jus-
tice. For example, the nun Miaojue 妙覺 concerns herself with advocacy for HIV victims 
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In short, Zhao’s Renjian Buddhism affirms the logic of power imposed 
by the party-state, and unconditionally accepts the legitimacy of the present 
political system. It does not develop a profound criticism of the secular 
world, politics included, using a Buddhist vision of morality, nor does it 
encourage an organized social movement for a wider application of justice. 
It is a Buddhism that stresses fitting into the world as given, not reforming 
it; it is politically collaborationist rather than socially engaged.
The lack of motivation for political criticism and social mobilization 
in Renjian Buddhism in the PRC is often attributed to the severe control 
exerted by the authoritarian state. Indeed, political collaborationism becomes 
the primary requirement that the CCP demands of the Buddhist establish-
ment and the official establishments of all legal religions. The policy of 
Jiang Zemin on party relations with religious institutions stated in 1991, 
while he was General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC, fol-
lowed a principle of “unity and cooperation in politics, mutual respect in 
faith.”46 Recently, Wang Zuoan, head of the State Bureau of Religious 
Affairs, reaffirmed this principle as “reflecting accurately the spirit of the 
relationship between the state and religion in contemporary China.”47 In 
this context, the collaborationist discourse and actions of Zhao Puchu are 
often regarded as difficult choices made for the sake of Buddhism’s general 
interests under PRC governance. Zhao himself is often portrayed by Bud-
dhist leaders and scholars as a saint who had to eat dirt in order to carry 
out some important task, a “Great Protector of Dharma” (da hufa 大護法) 
and even a “Bodhisattva” ( pusa 菩薩).48 But the question remains whether 
collaboration was the only option. Or more generally, when faced with a 
state power that oppresses and uses religions, what would be the sensible 
abandoned by the government since the 2000s. She is also engaged with other lay non-
Buddhist Chinese citizens in mobilizing support for imprisoned human rights activists such 
as Hu Jia 胡佳, Xu Zhiyong 許志永, and Chen Guangcheng 陳光誠. Another example is the 
monk Shengguan 聖觀, who held in 2006 a Buddhist commemorative ceremony for the 
victims of violence during the Chinese democratic movement of 1989. He has demanded 
freedom of expression and urged the immediate release of all political prisoners, as well as 
meeting with the Dalai Lama in India in 2011. Their efforts, however, remain individual 
and have not prompted a sizeable social movement. They are of course not supported 
by the official Buddhist establishment, and, as dissidents, are monitored by the Chinese 
government.
46 Jiang 1991.
47 Wang 2009.
48 See for example Mingshan 2000, Fang 2000, Jing Yin 2000, Chuanyin 2011.
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choice to ensure the wellbeing of Buddhist community or Sangha? On this 
question, the ideas of Nhat Hanh are diametrically opposed to those of Zhao 
and his apologists:
Be aware that the essence and aim of the Sangha is the practice 
of understanding and compassion, we are determined not to use 
the Buddhist community for personal gain or profit or transform 
our community into a political instrument. A spiritual community 
should, however, take a clear stand against oppression and injus-
tice and should strive to change the situation without engaging in 
partisan conflicts. . . . Religious leaders may be tempted to sup-
port their government in exchange for the material well-being of 
their community. This has occurred throughout recorded history. 
In order to secure their government’s support, religious communi-
ties often refrain from speaking out against oppression and injus-
tices committed by their government. Allowing politicians to use 
your religious community to strengthen their political power is to 
surrender the spiritual sovereignty of your community.49
In this respect, Taixu, who with his “Buddhism for human life” is considered 
to be the closest to the Nationalist regime, did not renounce his universalist 
stance, the moral supremacy of religion, nor did he give up on an ideal of 
independence for monastic authority. Taixu and his disciples maintained that 
Buddhist cosmology constituted a foundation of values for a genuine demo-
cratic state. They were opposed to radical nationalism and had neutralized 
to a certain degree the xenophobic content of nationalism with the Buddhist 
notion of “non-self ” (wuwo 無我). Using non-self, Taixu put forward a 
nationalism that was non-violent and non-essentialist.50 Consequently, with 
regard to the relationship between politics and religion, Zhao’s Renjian 
Buddhism differs vastly from the Renjian Buddhism of Taixu.
Concluding Remarks: A Testament Betrayed?
Although Zhao Puchu has never publicly acknowledged Taixu’s contribu-
tions to Chinese Buddhism, when Taixu was “rehabilitated” in mainland 
China in 1987, Zhao started to imply that he was the spiritual successor to 
Taixu in several personal meetings. One of these meetings was with Weixian 
惟賢 (1920–2013) of Ciyunsi 慈雲寺 in Chongqing, who had once studied in 
49 Thich Nhat Hanh 1998, p. 43.
50 Gong 2003.
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an institute founded by Taixu in the 1930s and who was widely recognized 
as his disciple. In 1988, Zhao recounted his last meeting with Taixu to 
Weixian, explaining that several days before his passing at Yufosi 玉佛寺 
in Shanghai, Taixu asked Zhao to meet him. At that time, Taixu gave Zhao 
a copy of his Buddhism for Human Life and said, “I completed this book 
only after many years of revision. . . . I present it to you, for you to study 
it well and carry on its ideas.”51 Obviously, such words would imply that 
Taixu in his final moments had identified Zhao as the heir to his tradition 
of “Buddhism for human life.” Zhao repeated the same story to Xingyun 星
雲 (or Hsing Yun, born 1927), founder of Foguangshan and one of the most 
active advocates of Renjian Buddhism in Taiwan, when the latter visited 
mainland China in 1994. In Nanjing, Zhao also told Xingyun that only 
recently had he “suddenly” understood Taixu’s message for him, explaining 
that Taixu’s plan to travel to Wuxi and Changzhou, was actually a prediction 
of his own death. The first characters of the names of the two cities “wu” 
and “chang” make up the Buddhist term for impermanence (wuchang 無常). 
Then, according to Zhao, Taixu earnestly urged him to “safeguard Chinese 
Buddhism.”52
However, Zhao’s words could not have been the whole truth. Taixu’s 
pun was not “suddenly” understood by Zhao in 1994, nor in 1988 when 
he told the same anecdote in his conversation with Weixian. In fact, Zhao 
had explained it in his own note to a eulogy he composed for Taixu, which 
was published two weeks after Taixu’s death in 1947.53 In the note, we 
see that it was not Zhao himself who had understood the meaning of the 
pun of wuchang, but the abbot of Yufosi, Weiyi 葦一 (1905–1963). More 
importantly, Taixu did not exhort Zhao to “safeguard Chinese Buddhism,” 
but to “come more often, when time permitted, to the Chinese Buddhist 
Association (Zhongguo Fojiaohui 中國佛教會),” the Buddhist organization 
headed by Taixu, which had an anti-communist stance and fled to Taiwan 
along with the Nationalist Government in 1949. In later reprints, the note in 
1947 was, not surprisingly, rephrased.54
Putting Zhao’s attitudes toward Taixu aside, it remains a question whether 
Zhao really “safeguarded” Chinese Buddhism. Unlike his biographers in 
51 Weixian 2008.
52 Xingyun 1997.
53 Zhao 1947a.
54 Zhao 2003, p. 8. In the reprinted version, the form of address of Taixu in the poem’s title 
also changed from the extremely respectful “Great Master” (dashi 大師) to a common address 
of “Dharma Master” ( fashi 法師) that can be used to any monk and had no emotional con-
notations.
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the PRC, who praise him as a saint who devoted his life to Buddhism, Zhao 
himself placed a higher value on his contributions to the party-state. In 
November 1996, four years before his death, Zhao wrote an eight-line “Poem 
of Recollection at Ninety Years of Age.”55 In the latter half he summarized 
what he believed to be his most important achievements: first, he had 
replenished the human resources needed by the communist New Fourth 
Army in 1938 by dispatching people selected from among war refugees 
taking shelter with a Buddhist organization in Shanghai; second, in 1961 
in New Delhi, as a member of the Chinese delegation for an international 
meeting, he made a public retort to the Indian Minister of Culture on the 
Tibetan issue and the Sino-Indian border conflict; third, during 1962–1964, 
he contrib uted to pushing Japan to finally recognize the PRC in 1972, by 
inducing Japanese Buddhists to pressure their government in Sino-Japanese 
Buddhist exchanges. All three represent service to politics drawing upon 
Buddhism; none of them can be regarded as protection or propagation of 
Buddhism itself.
Indeed, no matter how one evaluates Zhao today, it is undeniable that 
the fifty years during which he was responsible for the administration of 
Chinese Buddhism were also fifty years of unprecedented devastation for 
this religion. Even today, after more than thirty years of revival following 
the Cultural Revolution, Chinese Buddhism has not yet regained the level 
of activity it displayed during the pre-communist period in the first half of 
the twentieth century.56 Should Chinese Buddhists not ask themselves, “Why 
did Zhao preside over Buddhism’s decline?” For an answer to this ques tion, 
maybe we can find some inspiration in an article Zhao wrote to commemo-
rate Taixu, published in 1947 when the author was relatively young. Zhao did 
not mention this article during his half century of administrative leadership:
Present-day Chinese Buddhism enjoys no human rights. It is absurd 
to demand that Buddhism propagate the Dharma, benefit sentient 
55 Zhao (1996) 2008.
56 Arguing from a communist position, in all his accounts of contemporary history Zhao 
negatively assessed Republican-era Buddhism. But in fact, it can be argued that Buddhism 
was vital and flourishing from 1912 through 1949, despite incessant wars and military 
conflicts. Not only was the total number of monks and monasteries higher than today, but 
so was the number of Buddhist institutes and journals. Thanks to a widely enjoyed freedom 
of association and the press of the time, Buddhist social organization, social and political 
participation, and output of scholarly and artistic works were, in many respects, unmatched 
by Buddhism in the present-day PRC. On Chinese Buddhism in the first half of the twentieth 
century, see Welch 1968. For a quantitative study on the level of religious mobilization of 
Buddhism in post-Mao China, see Ji 2013.
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beings, protect the country, and support the people when it is itself 
unprotected by human rights. To say, “save both self and others,” 
means only that one should first save oneself from persecution 
and the wrongs of the day, and then save all sentient beings. The 
present task of Buddhists should be to struggle for the human 
rights of Buddhism [itself].57
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